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I. INTRODUCTION 
Taxation law, which includes a regulation of the wide ranging powers of the 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR), is largely perceived as a specialist 
area with its own unique rules. It however shares an important attribute with 
other areas of law such as administrative law, constitutional law, industrial 
law and criminal law .1 This shared attribute is that, like these other areas of 
law, taxation law forms a significant part of public law. The law of taxation 
seeks to regulate the relationship between the state and the citizen as far as 
the impost and collection of tax revenues are concerned. 
The Privy Council identified three features which earmarked a "tax". These 
were that a tax was compulsory, that this compulsory levy was for public 
purposes, and that there was legal sanction for the exaction of the impost.2 
These attributes were later adopted by Latham CJ of the High Court of 
Australia as being of general application in determining when an exaction of 
money would be characterised as a tax. A tax in his view was "a compulsory 
exaction of money by a public authority for public purposes, enforceable by 
law, and not a payment for services rendered") 
The interface between state and citizen in taxation gives rise to a heightened 
sense of tension and indeed conflict for at least two reasons. First, there is a 
glaring and substantial imbalance in the power and resources between state 
and citizen in the taxation relationship. The state, through its agent the 
2 
3 
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Commissioner of Inland Revenue (CIR)4 and his Department,S can bring a 
vast amount of power to bear on the hapless citizen. These powers include 
the ability to require taxpayers or their advisers to supply information about 
the taxpayers' liability for any tax. The information can also be required to 
be supplied for the purposes of administering and enforcing the Inland 
Revenue Acts6 or for the purpose of carrying out any function lawfully 
conferred on the Commissioner. This power to have information supplied 
can be done simply by a statutory notice to this effect7 or by application for 
a court orderS legally obliging the taxpayer or its advisers to supply this 
information. In the event of failure to comply with the court order, the 
taxpayer will be in contempt of court. Alternatively, the taxpayer can be 
prosecuted for the offence of failing to comply with a section 17 statutory 
notice.9 More pervasive is the Commissioner's power to enter business or 
private premises to obtain information about a taxpayer's affairs.IO The 
Commissioner is also empowered to require a person to attend and give 
evidence on oath before the Commissioner or any officer of his 
Department. I I There is also power for the Commissioner to hold an inquiry 
before a District Court Judge for the purpose of obtaining information. I2 
In essence, therefore, through a combination of measures where either 
information is supplied by the taxpayer or compulsorily and proactively 
acquired by the Commissioner, extensive information can be obtained about 
taxpayers. The Commissioner's pervasive powers to gather information are 
often resented because of the time and expense incurred in complying with 
them.l3 
The second reason for tension between the taxpayer and the Commissioner 
arises because of the intrinsic nature of taxation where the private property 
4 
5 
6 
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9 
A creature of statute in terms of s 6A (I) of the Tax Administration Act 1994 (T AA). 
Hardie Boys J, in Knight v C of IR [1991] 2 NZLR 30, 42 observed that "the 
Commissioner is a statutory officer". 
Tax Administration Act 1994, s 5. 
Outlined in the schedule to the T AA. 
Section 17. 
Section 17 A. 
Section 17A(4). 
10 Section 16. 
I I Section 19. For further comment see McClay, "Section 19 inquiries" (July 2001) 3 
New Zealand Tax Planning Report 22. 
I2 Section 18. 
I3 See comments by Lord Templeman in New Zealand Stock Exchange v CIR (1991) 13 
NZTC 8147, 8151 in respect of third parties who are served with s 17 notices. 
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rights of the citizen must succumb to encroachment by the state. The nature 
of taxation is a legally sanctioned right of expropriation by the state of what 
has hitherto been legitimately acquired private property or wealth by the 
efforts of individual or corporate taxpayers. The challenge for the taxpayer 
therefore is legitimately to minimise the state's entitlement to his or her 
private wealth, as articulated by Lord Tomlin: 
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax attaching under 
the appropriate Act is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering 
them so as to secure this result, then however unappreciative the Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be 
compelled to pay an increased tax.l4 
A more illustrative and vivid portrayal of this competing right of the state to 
private wealth were the comments of Lord President Clyde that: 
No man in this country is under the smallest obligation, moral or other, so as to 
arrange his legal relations to his business or to his property as to enable the Inland 
Revenue to put the largest possible shovel into his stores. The Inland Revenue is not 
slow - and quite rightly - to take every advantage which is open to it under the 
taxing statutes for the purpose of depleting the taxpayer's rocket. And the taxpayer 
is, in like manner, entitled to be astute to prevent, so far as he honestly can, the 
depletion of his means by the Revenue. IS 
Despite the very long and powerful arm of the Commissioner to interfere in 
the lives of private citizens, there are legal rules about how the law creates 
the liability for taxation. These rules set out how this pre-existing liability is 
quantified and a tax debt created, whereby the citizen becomes liable to 
make payment. Where there is default in paying the debt when it falls due, 
the Commissioner has a number of options for enforcing the payment of this 
debt. 
This article seeks to examine specifically the legal issues regarding the 
creation of the liability for taxation under New Zealand law, the legal 
process of assessment and its effect in giving rise to a tax debt payable by 
the taxpayer, the consequences of the taxpayer defaulting in payment of the 
debt and options available to the Commissioner to enforce payment, recent 
public and other criticism of the Commissioner's powers to assess and 
14 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Westminster [1936] AC 1, 19-20. 
15 Ayrshire Pulman Motor Services and D M Ritchie v The Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue (1929) 14 Tax Cases 754. 
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collect debts in an expeditious fashion, and the prospect of more proactive 
use of the statutory notice procedure to collect tax debts. 
II. THE LIABILITY FORT AXATION UNDER NEW ZEALAND LAW 
McCarthy J, in the Court of Appeal decision in Reckitt & Colman v Taxation 
Board of Review agreed with the argument of counsel for the respondents, 
Richardson (now Richardson P of the Court of Appeal), in respect of the 
general scheme of Inland Revenue Acts.16 This was that liability for tax is 
imposed by the charging section in the case of income tax by the governing 
Act. It is the Act itself which imposes, independently, the obligation to pay. 
This cardinal principle has been reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in 
subsequent decisions, namely, those of Lowe v CIR,17 C of IR v Lemmington 
Holdings Ltd ,18 C of IR v NZ Stock Exchange, C of IR v National Bank of 
NZ Ltd,19 Brierley Investments Ltd v C of IR,20 CIR v Canterbury Frozen 
Meat Company Ltd21, and BNZ Finance v Holland.22 Section AA 1(a) of the 
Income Tax Act 1994 (IT A 1994) provides that one of the main purposes of 
the Act is to impose tax on income, thus confirming that the Act creates the 
charge for tax. 
Ill. THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS AND THE CREATION OF A TAX DEBT 
I. The Legal Process of Assessment 
The pre-existing liability is quantified by the Commissioner and section 92 
of the Tax Administration Act 1994 imposes a duty on the Commissioner to 
make assessments on the following basis: 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
From the returns made under sections 33, 34, 36 to 39, 41 to 44, 63, 79, and 80 and 
from any other information in the Commissioner's possession the Commissioner 
shall in and for every year, and from time to time and at any subsequent time as may 
be necessary, assess the taxable income and income tax liability of the taxpayer and 
the tax payable by the taxpayer. 
[1966] NZLR 1032, 1045. 
[1981] NZLR 326, 344. 
(1982) 5 NZTC 61268, 61272. 
(1990) 12 NZTC 7259, 7262. 
(1993) 15 NZTC 10,212, 10214. 
(1994) 18 TRNZ 645, 650. 
(1997) 18NZTC 13156,13160. 
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In C of IR v NZ Stock Exchange, Richardson J commented on the provisions 
in the then equivalent of sections 16-19 of the TAA for the furnishing of 
information, the inspection and production of documents, and the holding of 
inquiries, all designed to facilitate access by the Commissioner to 
information.23 The eliciting of such information was to provide a basis for 
exercising the function of making assessments against taxpayers. The 
process which the Commissioner must adhere to in making an assessment 
was the subject of the Court of Appeal decision in Canterbury Frozen Meat 
Company Ltd.24 An assessment is essentially the making of a judgment by 
the Commissioner of the amount on which tax is payable and the amount of 
the tax. Richardson J in the Canterbury Frozen Meat case provided a useful 
summary of his conclusions on the meaning of assessment when he 
commented as follows: 
An assessment is the quantification by the Commissioner of the statutorily imposed 
liability of the particular taxpayer to tax for the year in question. The making of an 
assessment, including an amended assessment, requires the exercise of judgment on 
the part of the Commissioner in quantifying that liability on the information then in 
the Commissioner's possession. It involves the "ascertainment" of the taxable 
income and of the resulting tax liability just as it does under the Australian definition 
of "assessment" which uses the expression ascertainment .... 
The making of an assessment determines the indebtedness of the subject to the 
Crown. That liability is unqualified. Sanctions are provided for failure to pay. It 
follows that a decision which is tentative, or provisional, or subject to adjustment, or 
conditional does not reflect the statutory scheme. In short, to constitute an 
assessment for income tax purposes the decision of the Commissioner must be 
definitive as to the liability of the taxpayer at the time it is made, and final subject 
only to challenge through the objection process.25 
Once an assessment has been made it is conclusively deemed and taken to 
be correct and its validity cannot be disputed except in proceedings on 
objection to the assessment under Part VIII or a challenge under Part VIllA 
of the TAA.26 
23 Supra note 19, at 7262-3. 
24 Supra note 21. 
25 Ibid, 655. This was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal inC of IR v New Zealand Wool 
Board (1999)19 NZTC 15476, 15,488-15,489. 
26 Section 109 TAA. The administrative law remedy of judicial review may be available 
to challenge the validity of the process by which an assessment was made. 
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Under the Australian statutory scheme, in all cases, the service of a notice of 
assessment is the occasion of liability, "the levying of the tax".27 As 
observed by the majority judgment in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v 
Harkin, "under the Income Tax Assessment Act the liability of the taxpayer 
does not come into existence until there has been an assessment by the 
commissioner of the tax payable and notice of that assessment has been 
given by the commissioner to the taxpayer".28 The High Court of Australia 
had also concluded that a notice of assessment was essential to the existence 
of an assessment in F J Bloemen Pty Ltd v F C ofT. 29 
New Zealand's position is distinctly different from the Australian position, 
as very recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Hyslop v C of IR.30 
The issue on appeal in Hyslop was whether failure to give the taxpayers 
notice of the grounds of assessment invalidated the assessment. The essence 
of the Court of Appeal decision was that, while the then equivalent to 
section 111(1) of the TAA 1994 required that the notice of assessment be 
given to the taxpayer "as soon as conveniently may be after an assessment is 
made", the omission to give such notice will not invalidate the assessment in 
terms of section 111(6). This reinforced the provisions of the then equivalent 
of section 114 of the T AA 1994 which provides that the validity of an 
assessment is not affected by failure to comply with any statutory provision 
in either the TAA 1994 or the ITA 1994. Accordingly, the New Zealand 
statutory scheme made it clear that it was the assessment that quantified the 
indebtedness, the validity of which remained unaffected in the absence of 
notification of such assessment being conveyed to the taxpayer through any 
of the avenues in section 14 of the T AA. 
2. An Assessment For Tax and Tax Indebtedness 
Once a taxpayer is notified of an assessment for tax, the notification also 
stipulates a due date by which the tax owing is to be paid. On the expiry of 
the due date for payment, the debt then becomes not only owing to the 
Commissioner but also one in respect of which enforcement action can be 
taken for its recovery)! It is useful to make the distinction between on the 
27 Batagol v FC ofT (1963) 9 AITR 207,214, per Kitto J. 
28 (1959) 100 CLR 566, 573. 
29 81 ATC 4280. 
30 (200 1) 20 NZTC 17,031. This was followed recently in C of IR v Dandelion 
Investments Ltd (2001) 20 NZTC 17,293, 17,296, per Tompkins J. 
31 An identical view was expressed by Gibbs CJ in the High Court of Australia decision 
of Clyne v DFC of T 81 ATC 4429 regarding the due date for payment and 
indebtedness when he said: "At the latest when tax is assessed it becomes a debt due to 
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one hand the creation of a tax debt by making an assessment and issuing due 
notification of it, and, on the other, taking enforcement action in good time 
that recovers the debt. 
3. The Consequences of Taxpayer Default and Enforcement Options 
As noted by Richardson J in Canterbury Frozen Meat Co Ltd, "sanctions are 
provided for failure to pay". 32 The recent report of Parliament's Finance and 
Expenditure Committee of its Inquiry into the Powers and Operations of the 
Inland Revenue Department (chaired by Peter Dunne and hereinafter 
referred to as the "Dunne Report"), highlights the consequences in these 
terms: 
If the debt remains unpaid and there is no prospect of immediate payment, the 
department needs to consider management options available to it. Although the 
department's preference is to recover debt by voluntary payment in full, recovery 
can also be by way of voluntary time payment (for example, an instalment 
arrangement), or by compulsory deduction. If a taxpayer is in financial difficulty the 
department can, in limited circumstances, provide relief from debt by way of write-
off, cancellation or remission. 33 
Section 7 A of the T AA provides the Commissioner with a wide-ranging 
power to take securities in respect of the performance of tax obligations. 
Section 3 defines "security" for the purposes of section 7 A to mean a 
security given to the Commissioner to secure the performance of a tax 
obligation, and includes a mortgage or charge or other encumbrance over, or 
pledge of, an asset or right and a guarantee or idemnity. Where securities 
become inadequate or insufficient, the Commissioner is empowered to call 
for additional or substitute securities. The Commissioner can require that 
securities be transferred into the name of the Commissioner and be held 
until such time as a tax obligation or obligations are performed. There is also 
provision in section 7 A(l)(e) for enforcement of the security where the 
taxpayer defaults in the performance of a tax obligation. 
the Crown although it is not payable until the later date specified in the notice of 
assessment" (at 4432 RHC). 
32 Supra note 21, at 655. 
33 Inquiry into the powers and operations of the Inland Revenue Department, Report of 
the Finance and Expenditure Committee (October 1999) 15. 
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IV. CRITICISM OF THE COMMISSIONER'S POWERS 
TO ASSESS AND ENFORCE TAX DEBTS 
Vol9 
I. The Dunne Report 
The Commissioner and his Department appear to have recently come under 
sustained criticism for not properly assessing or efficiently collecting tax 
debt. The Report of the Commission of Inquiry constituted to inquire into 
certain tax matters (the Davison Commission) - a highly publicised 
Commission of Inquiry known as "the Winebox Inquiry" - highlighted 
criticism of the manner in which large corporate tax debts had been 
assessed. While the Report substantially vindicated the Commissioner's 
conduct in respect of matters dealt with in the Report, the findings of the 
Report were substantially overturned by the Full Court of the High Court in 
Peters v Davison.34 
Further criticism was made of the way in which the enforcement powers of 
the Commissioner had been employed both in terms of the options 
embarked on and their effectiveness. Before making its adverse findings, the 
Dunne Report found that, while the Commissioners powers were 
considerable, they were appropriate and their rationale was explained as 
follows: 
While the Commissioner's powers are extensive, we consider that, by and large, 
these powers are appropriate for the role the Commissioner is required to undertake. 
The department is bound to enforce compliance on the part of all taxpayers. Not to 
do so would seriously damage the integrity of the tax system and undermine the 
system of voluntary compliance. The extent of the Commissioner's powers is 
necessary to ensure that reluctant taxpayers meet their obligations. Those powers 
ensure that taxpayers who willingly pay their tax are not disadvantaged or required 
to pay a disproportionate share of the tax burden. 35 
However, in its findings on how effectively these wide powers had been 
used in the collection of tax debts, the Dunne report was critical. The 
Department was urged to become involved in collecting outstanding tax at 
an earlier stage than was the case. Under the Department's then current 
policies and procedures, recovery action was being instigated when any 
realistic chance of recovery had long passed. The report noted that in many 
cases the first contact with the taxpayer for tax arrears was "several months 
34 (1999) 19 NZTC 15,391. 
35 Supra note 32, at 6. 
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after the due date has passed".36 If the emergence of tax debt was recognised 
early, there was a better chance of recovery from the Department's 
perspective and the matter would be more manageable from the taxpayer's 
perspective before the imposition of late payment penalties and use of 
money interest (UOMI) caused small debts to become much higher and 
beyond the ability of the taxpayer to meet.37 
The Dunne Report then commented on specific management options for tax 
debt taken by the Department and their effectiveness. These options were 
bankruptcy action in the case of individual taxpayers and liquidation 
proceedings in relation to corporate taxpayers. 
In respect of bankruptcy proceedings, the report noted that in the period 1 
July 1998 to 30 June 1999, the department had referred 1000 individuals for 
bankruptcy and 995 companies for liquidation. Worth noting was that, in 44 
percent of those cases, proceedings were subsequently withdrawn as either 
the debt was paid in full or arrangements were entered into whereby the debt 
would be paid over a period of time. The report specifically commented on 
the effectiveness of the use of bankruptcy proceedings in collecting debt 
when it said: 
Many bankruptcy proceedings could be avoided if the department became actively 
involved in taxpayers' affairs sooner rather that later, to halt the growth of debt. By 
the time the department does get involved the debt is so large the department has no 
other choice but to bankrupt.38 
While the department acknowledged that bankruptcy and liquidation 
proceedings were debt management options of last resort, it appeared that 
bankruptcy action was embarked upon when the debt became unmanageable 
for the taxpayer. Thus it seems that bankruptcy action was pursued as a 
means of stopping the continuing rapid escalation of debt rather than as an 
effective debt collection option. There is a suggestion albeit implied in those 
comments that the bankrupt's estate usually falls far short of being able to 
36 Ibid, 15. 
37 Ibid. A recent example of such rapid escalation of debt is illustrated in Re Hunter, ex 
parte C of IR; Re Collins, ex parte C of IR (2000)19 NZTC 15,722, where the initial 
debts totalled about $50,000. The payment which was anticipated was $200 per month, 
or $2,400 per year. Robertson 1 further commented as follows: "In the meantime, late 
payment penalties were accruing at the rate of 10% every 6 months which is at least 
$10,000 per year and very quickly a great deal more than that as the late payment 
penalties compounded" (at 15,726). 
38 Supra note 32, at 18. 
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meet any realistic portion of the substantial tax indebtedness. At best 
perhaps is the prospect of collection of a portion of the preferential amounts 
of goods and services tax (GST) or Pay As You Earn (PAYE) taxes. 
As far as liquidations were concerned, the Report was critical of the 
statutory preference the department had under section 312 of the Companies 
Act 1993 and the seventh schedule to that Act. It appeared as if, in addition 
to having its claim for preferential tax debt paid, it was also in addition to 
the core debt being paid interest and penalties which did not enjoy the same 
preferential status as the core debt. The overall consequence was that the 
Commissioner through his department was obtaining payments which were 
more than his legal entitlement. This increased claim was being met at the 
expense of claims by the remaining pool of unsecured creditors who were 
left with very little if anything of the company's assets from which to have 
their residual amounts of the company's indebtedness met. 
The resonant theme of the Dunne Report, in respect of the Commissioner's 
tax debt collection efforts, appears to be that the timely pursuit of debt is 
crucial. There were submissions made to the Dunne Committee, notably by 
Price Waterhouse Coopers, which suggested that the Department should 
adopt approaches similar to trading banks and put in place prompt follow-up 
procedures for overdue debts. The Dunne Report commented that a follow-
up system had to be put in place but one which was far more sophisticated 
than the one for banks in terms of early action for recovery. This was 
because of the peculiar feature of tax debt which faced the accumulation of 
late payment penalties and UOMI, causing it to spiral out of control much 
quicker than in the case of non tax debts. 
2. Judicial Criticism of Tax Administration by the Commissioner 
It appears therefore that the Commissioner and his department have come 
under concerted pressure to act early. This is in addition to criticism for 
delay in the Department's performance in respect of other matters by Judge 
Willy as the Taxation Review Authority (TRA) in the decision in TRA Case 
No 93/013. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in its decision in Union 
Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v C of IR criticised the Commissioner for 
a 21-year delay before a tax dispute finally arrived for a hearing at the High 
Court.39 
39 (1996) 17 NZTC 12,630, 12,631, per Blanchard J. More recently, Robertson J, in Re 
Hunter; ex parte C of IR; Re Collins; ex parte C of IR (2000) 19 NZTC 15,722 
commented on the manner in which the Commissioner and his department dealt with 
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It is suggested that, in view of such sustained criticism of the Commissioner 
in regard to his functions of assessing and collecting tax debts, he should 
become pro-active in collecting debt at a much earlier stage. This may well 
occur through the use of a highly effective but less-known power of 
collection, namely, compulsory deductions. The compulsory deductions may 
be effected by the Commissioner through his departmental officers serving a 
statutory notice under section 157 of the T AA. 
V. TAX DEBT COLLECTION USING STATUTORY NOTICE PROCEDURE 
I. Introduction 
The powers to collect tax debts under section 157 place the Commissioner in 
a distinctly privileged position vis-a-vis other creditors. An ordinary 
creditor, in seeking to enforce collection of a trade debt for instance, would 
first seek to obtain a Court judgment for the debt usually in the District 
Court. The creditor, having obtained judgment, would then need to obtain a 
garnishee order from the Court which would enable a garnishee notice to be 
served on a third party namely a creditor of the debtor. The effect of serving 
this notice on the third party would be to have it pay the judgment creditor 
direct rather than the judgment debtor to which it is ordinarily indebted. 
Thus, in a very common example where this procedure is used to great 
effect, if a tenant owed rent, the landlord, having obtained a garnishee notice 
in the manner described, would serve the garnishee notice on the tenant's 
employer or other creditor. This would have the effect of ordering the 
employer to pay a portion of the tenant's salary or wages directly to the 
landlord to offset rent arrears. Section 157 achieves an identical result but 
without the Commissioner having first to obtain judgment. Simply arriving 
at an assessment for a tax debt, and waiting for the expiry of the due date for 
its payment specified in the notice of assessment, are all that is required 
before a section 157 garnishee notice can be served on a creditor of the 
taxpayer. 40 
the taxpayer, as follows: "There is no doubt that bureaucratically things could and 
should have been done better" (at 15,732). 
40 It was this ambit of the power that perhaps prompted Gibbs CJ of the Australian High 
Court to comment in respect of the equivalent provision in Australia as follows: 
"However the section is obviously designed to confer exceptional powers on the 
Commissioner to facilitate the collection of tax" (Clyne v DFC ofT 81 4429 , 4433). 
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2. The Provisions of Section 157 
Section 157 contains 10 subsections. Subsection (1) provides that, where the 
taxpayer has made default in paying any income tax or penalty to the 
Commissioner, the Commissioner may by notice in writing require any 
creditor of the taxpayer to make deductions from amounts owing to the 
taxpayer. The creditor will then be required by virtue of the notice to pay the 
amounts to the Commissioner. 
Where the notice relates to deductions from salary, subsection (3) provides 
that the amount deducted cannot be more than the greater of $10 per week or 
the lesser of either 10% per week of the income tax owing or 20% of the 
wages or salary payable. There is provision in subsection (4) for the 
Commissioner to revoke such notice at any time. There are procedural 
matters in subsection (5), namely, that any notice so given must have a copy 
of it issued to the taxpayer. The rationale is that the taxpayer must be kept 
informed of the fact that a notice was served on a creditor of the taxpayer, so 
that the taxpayer can respond if need be. There is no time frame specified in 
which the taxpayer must be served a copy, the statutory requirement merely 
being that such must be done "forthwith". This would usually be either at 
the time of service on the creditor of the taxpayer debtor or shortly 
thereafter. Subsection (6) requires the creditor to send the taxpayer debtor a 
written statement attesting to the fact that a deduction was made and the 
reason for it. 
Subsections (8) and (9) provide that, where a notice is served on an ordinary 
creditor of the defaulting taxpayer or a bank, the moneys that may be held 
by them for the taxpayer are, from the point of service, deemed to be held in 
trust for the Crown and recoverable from the creditor or bank as if they were 
income tax payable by the debtor.4I 
41 In the early decision in R v Norfolk County Council (1890) 60 LJQB 379, 380-381, 
Cave J explained the meaning of deem as follows: "generally speaking, when you talk 
of a thing being deemed to be something, you do not mean to say that it is that which it 
is to be deemed to be. It is rather an admission that it is not what it is to be deemed to 
be, and that, notwithstanding it is not that particular thing, nevertheless, for the 
purposes of the Act, it is to be deemed to be that thing". Lord Radcliffe in the House of 
Lords' decision in St Aubyn & Ors vA-G [1951]2 AllER 473 at 498 further observed 
as follows: "the word 'deemed' is used a great deal in modern legislation. Sometimes it 
is used to impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial construction of a word or 
phrase that would not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put beyond doubt a 
particular construction that might otherwise be uncertain. Sometimes it is used to give 
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3. Case Law Commentary on the Application of section 157 
There appear to date to have been at least six reported decisions on the 
application of section 157 and its predecessor section 400 of the Income Tax 
Act 1976 (ITA 1976). The earliest decision in Anzamco Ltd (in liq) v Bank 
of New Zealand,42 and the most recent decision in Hieber v C of IR,43 were 
ones where the issues in dispute concerned whether the statutory procedures 
for serving an effective statutory notice had been followed. 
In Anzamco, the company sold farm land for a profit of more than $3 million 
and the Commissioner's assessment for income tax of $623,417 was owing 
by the company. Shortly thereafter the company went into voluntary 
liquidation. The liquidator objected to the assessment. In addition, on 22 
March 1982, the liquidator placed $935,500 of the company's funds on a 
term deposit with the Bank of New Zealand Hamilton North Branch. The 
liquidator, who had sole control of the money, undertook to hold the amount 
claimed under the assessment until final determination of the objection. This 
was done to cover the contingency of the Commissioner succeeding in the 
objection proceedings. 
On 25 August 1982, the liquidator was informed by the Bank of New 
Zealand, Hamilton Branch, which was separate and distinct from the 
Hamilton North Branch, that a section 400 notice had been served. The 
notice required payment to be made of about $629,000 by 31 August 1982. 
At the date of the High Court hearing, almost two months after the bank had 
been served, neither the company nor the liquidator had been served a copy 
of the notice pursuant to section 400 (6) (section 157 (5)). 
The Commissioner was criticised for acting rather arbitrarily in using the 
statutory notice procedure, for two reasons. First, objection proceedings had 
been set in train to hear the objection to the tax assessment. Secondly, the 
actions were taken in complete disregard of deliberate measures taken by the 
liquidator to hold a lump sum at the Hamilton North Branch in order to meet 
the contingency of having to pay the whole of the assessed amount in the 
event of the Commissioner's success at the objection proceedings. 
a comprehensive description that includes what is obvious, what is uncertain and what 
is, in the ordinary sense, impossible". 
42 (1982) 5 NZTC 61249. 
43 (2000) 19 NZTC 15716. The High Court decision in Highfield v C of IR (2000) 19 
NZTC 15,609, although it involved a s 157 notice, did not analyse or discuss any 
aspect of the provisions ins 157, as there was no need to do this. 
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One of the grounds on which the applicant sought to have the notice set 
aside was that an inappropriate form had been used inconsistent with what 
section 400 authorised. Barker J upheld this ground on the basis that the 
wording of the notice did not meet the statutory test. The notice contained a 
direction to the bank to deduct a percentage amount from sums payable to 
the taxpayer. The statutory authorisation had been to direct the deduction of 
an amount and not a percentage amount. 
The Commissioner was accordingly found to have been in breach of the 
statutory provision as he had made a demand on the bank which he was not 
authorised to make. It may be argued that the Commissioner failed on a 
mere technicality, namely through inappropriate wording of the notice, 
however such a breach was sufficiently serious to invalidate the notice 
because "[s]ince an attachment order interferes with the rights of the subject, 
the legislation authorising it must be followed strictly".44 
The notice was also sought to be impugned on the basis that it was 
addressed to the wrong branch of the bank, namely the Hamilton branch, 
when it should have been the Hamilton North branch. Barker J held that 
such defect in the notice was not sufficient on its own to invalidate the 
notice. Furthermore, the notice was sought to be invalidated on the basis that 
a copy of it had not been served on either the company or its liquidator as 
was statutorily required. Barker J expressed the view that service was no 
empty formality as service of a copy provided the taxpayer with an 
opportunity to contest the notice.45 As indicated earlier, the provisions of 
section 157 (5) do not specify a time frame within which a copy of the 
notice ought to be served on the taxpayer, except to state that it must be 
done "forthwith". Barker J opined that the timeframe should be such time by 
which the garnishee is directed to pay the amount to the Commissioner. 
Other than issues of form and procedure for serving such notices, Barker J 
addressed wider issues of the propriety of issuing such notices in particular 
circumstances. It seemed pointless in his view to issue the notice when there 
44 Supra note 35, at 61255. 
45 Contrast this requirement of notification after the notice is served with the taxpayer's 
argument in Woodro.ffe v DFC ofT 2000 ATC 4656. In response to the argument 
Mansfield J commented that the decision to issue as 218 notice [equivalent to as 157 
notice] is not one of which advance notice is required to be given to the proposed 
recipient of the notice or to others whose money is to be the target of the notice (at 
4657). Emmett J in FC ofT v Macquarie Health Corporation Ltd & Ors 98 ATC 5214, 
5237, observed that a notice under s 218 is normally given without the knowledge of 
the relevant taxpayer, and often against the taxpayer's wishes. 
2001 Powers of Commissioner of Inland Revenue 105 
were funds being held to satisfy the full amount of the Commissioner's 
assessment in the event that this was warranted. Furthermore, even if the 
defects in the notice were rectified by a fresh valid notice being served, such 
later notice would be unreasonable in the circumstances where an amount in 
excess of the Commissioner's claim had been secured to meet it. 
4. Use of a Section I 57 Notice When Tax Assessment is Disputed 
Finally, the issue arose as to the interpretation to be given to the then 
equivalent of section128 (1) and 1381(1) of the TAA (section 34 of the ITA 
1976). The question was whether the Commissioner had an unfettered 
discretion to pursue recovery action using the statutory notice procedure 
when the taxpayer had embarked on the process of contesting the 
assessment through the case stated procedure. Barker J's response to this 
important question was that the former section 34 was silent on the Court's 
jurisdiction to stay recovery, when in the circumstances it would clearly be 
unjust to allow the notice to take effect before case stated proceedings had 
run their course. 
In essence section 34 provided that, where an assessment was being 
contested before the TRA or the Courts, the tax in dispute was split into 
deferrable and non-deferrable components. The non-deferrable tax had to be 
paid to the Commissioner while the deferrable amount would not be paid 
pending resolution of the dispute. This was despite the fact that both 
amounts were owing pursuant to a valid assessment. The intervention of 
legal proceedings contesting the correctness of the assessment allowed this 
partial dispensation to the taxpayer, but only in respect of the deferrable 
amount. 
This issue of the interrelationship between recovery action and the 
appropriateness of such action when a tax assessment was being disputed in 
the course of objection proceedings before a court arose for comment by 
Blanchard J in Miller v C of IR. 46 Although they were made in the context of 
bankruptcy proceedings that were being pursued by the Commissioner in 
respect of non-deferrable tax, the Judge's comments are equally relevant 
when recovery of non-deferrable tax is being pursued using the statutory 
notice procedure. Blanchard J's instructive comments were as follows: 
Section 34(2 (b) [section 128(1) and section 1381(1) of the TAA] provides that the 
obligation to pay and the right of the Commissioner to receive any tax, not being 
deferrable tax, "shall not be suspended by any objection, appeal or case stated, made 
46 (1993) 15 NZTC 10,187. 
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or requested under this Part of this Act". So the Commissioner is able to pursue the 
taxpayer against whom an assessment has been made while a case stated remains 
outstanding under Part III [now Part VIII of the T AA] and can obtain judgment 
against the taxpayer, levy execution and, at least in theory, bankrupt the taxpayer if 
the non-deferrable tax remains unpaid. The Commissioner is in the process of taking 
such steps against the Millers and the O'Neils who say they are quite unable to pay 
and are in danger of being bankrupted.47 
Towards the end of his Honour's judgment, indications were given of the 
Court's view of the propriety of the Commissioner's conduct in taking 
enforcement action in respect of non-deferrable tax, pending conclusion of 
objection proceedings. These comments would equally apply in cases where 
a statutory notice were used as the instrument of enforcement. His Honour's 
more salient comments were as follows: 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that the Commissioner would be justified in 
enforcing his post-assessment right to non-deferrable tax under s 34 [section 128 and 
section 1381 of the TAA] pending the conclusion of the objection procedures, except 
in such a way as may be necessary or prudent to protect the position of the revenue . 
. ... The Commissioner is by s 34 given very large and unusual powers and, where the 
fate of an objection is not clearcut, the Commissioner should use those powers 
sparingly. Seizure and certainly sale of assets may often be unjustified. The 
Commissioner ought also to proceed cautiously in the bringing of bankruptcy 
proceedings, particularly if security can be obtained or there is some other means of 
ensuring that available assets can be preserved until objections are determined. It 
would be cruel and inappropriate if a citizen should without good cause be made 
bankrupt by an agency of the State when ultimate liability for the debt in question 
has not been determined and, indeed, may be found not to exist. The Courts will lean 
in favour of protecting a taxpayer where the Commissioner's powers are being used 
excessively. 48 
It would be reasonable to infer that, when His Honour made reference to 
"seizure of assets", the rubric of the phrase could also extend to moneys that 
are "seized" pursuant to a section 157 notice. In cases where objection or 
challenge procedures are taking their course, the Commissioner should 
instead, and where feasible, seek security over other assets of the taxpayer, 
such as for example taking a security under section 7 A of the T AA over a 
taxpayer's house or other property. 
Certainly the approach of Barker J in Anzamco on the use of a section 157 
notice to enforce payment of non-deferrable tax, and the approach of 
47 At 10,193 LHC. 
48 Supra note 46, at 10,206 RHC. 
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Blanchard J in Miller v C of IR on the use of bankruptcy proceedings also to 
recover non-deferrable tax, seem to have a consistent approach. This is that 
such enforcement action is unwarranted where some other available asset 
can be taken as security or is indeed offered as security for the debt until 
challenge proceedings have been determined. There also seems to be an 
implication in both judgments that this cautious approach is warranted to 
safeguard the taxpayer's interest, pending ultimate resolution of the 
Commissioner's tax assessment. The Courts seem willing to take this 
approach where either the taxpayer's conduct is exemplary and directly 
protects the Commissioner's interest as in Anzamco, or as a minimum the 
taxpayer has not actively sought to prejudice the Commissioner's interest in 
any way as is illustrated in Miller v C of JR. 
However, the Courts appear quite willing to enforce directly the 
Commissioner's statutory right to non-deferrable tax where the taxpayer's 
actions give the appearance of tax evasion or there is a real risk that the 
taxpayer will dissipate its assets in a bid to frustrate the Commissioner's 
efforts to seek payment of assessed tax. This strict approach seems to have 
been evident in the most recent decision to consider section 157, namely, 
Hieber v C of IR.49 This case involved Mr Hieber an individual New 
Zealand taxpayer as the first applicant, a trust as the second applicant in 
which Mr Hieber was a trustee, a partnership between him and the trust as 
the third applicant, and a property-owning company controlled by Mr 
Hieber as the fourth applicant. As a result of investigations into Mr Hieber's 
affairs, the Commissioner concluded that Hieber had systematically sought 
to defraud the New Zealand Revenue using an overseas company that he 
controlled. The result of the investigation led to tax assessment notices being 
issued for millions of New Zealand dollars. When the Commissioner 
suspected that assets were being dissipated to frustrate the effect of the 
assessments, he successfully applied ex parte for a charging order over a 
property owned by Hieber and, as a second measure, served section 157 
notices on the tenants of a commercial complex in respect of the rental 
payments that they normally paid to the second and third applicants as 
owners and managers of the properties. 
The argument against the section 157 notices was in respect of their validity. 
This was that the notices could be valid only in cases where a taxpayer had 
defaulted in paying income tax for which it had become liable. The further 
and essential argument was that, where an assessment for tax was subject to 
challenge proceedings pursuant to Part VIllA of the T AA that sought to 
49 (2000) 19 NZTC 15716 and discussed in detail in Henderson, "Threshold Challenge to 
Sl57" (July 2000) 3 New Zealand Tax Planning Report 23. 
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challenge its correctness, no liability existed until such time as the liability 
pursuant to those proceedings had been finally determined. The Court 
responded to the argument by invoking the provisions of section 109 of the 
T AA which deems an assessment to be correct unless determined otherwise 
in objection proceedings under Part VIII or challenge proceedings under 
Part VIllA. The statutory presumption of correctness of an assessment under 
section 109 was, in Laurenson J's view, conclusive of final liability for the 
assessed tax. 
The Commissioner, being conscious of the fact that dispute proceedings 
would be filed by the taxpayer, limited the sums subject to the section 157 
notices to half of the tax assessed which was the non-deferrable amount. The 
non-deferrable amount was subject to an express statutory provision in 
section 1381 of the TAA which made it payable to the Commissioner despite 
the fact that challenge proceedings were in train. Laurenson J was in no 
doubt that section 1381 of the T AA was clear that, in dispute proceedings in 
relation to an assessment, 50 percent of the disputed tax had to be paid 
nonetheless, even though liability had not been finally resolved. Thus, a 
combination of section 109 which deemed an assessment to be correct and 
section 138I which made 50% of that deemed liability payable, was 
sufficient to have met the threshold requirement for the validity of a section 
157 notice. 
5. Use of Section 157 To Attach Amounts Not Subject To Tax Assessments 
The recent High Court decision in Singh v C of JR50 is perhaps the first of its 
kind in New Zealand in that it allows the Commissioner to retain excess 
amounts obtained under a section 157 notice where an expected assessment 
is very likely to be made of a taxation liability in the future. Such amounts 
can be retained where the Commissioner expects that, due to pending 
litigation, the taxpayer will be assessable for a future tax liability, which the 
retained amounts will to some extent satisfy. The decision in Singh appears 
to accept that a section 157 notice can be issued once there is an assessment 
giving rise to a tax debt. However, if the tax debt reduces to a sum that is 
less than the amount obtained pursuant to the notice, there is no obligation 
on the Commissioner to refund the balance to the taxpayer. 
In Singh, the applicant prepared and filed income tax returns for others. He 
claimed false refunds in his own returns and also in returns prepared and 
lodged on behalf of his clients. He retained all the falsely obtained refunds. 
On 4 November 1992 the Commissioner issued default assessments in 
50 (1999) 19 NZTC 15,050. 
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relation to the false refunds and also imposed additional tax. The applicant 
objected to the assessment and a case stated was set for hearing before the 
Taxation Review Authority (TRA). 
On 4 November 1994, the Commissioner served section 400 notices on 
various bank accounts under the applicant's control and thereby seized just 
under $87,000. On 12 December 1994, the Commissioner amended the 
original tax assessment which reduced the tax owed by the applicant. The 
applicant objected to this assessment also and asked for the dispute to be 
determined by the TRA. The applicant requested the Commissioner to 
refund him the difference between the amount in the second tax assessment 
and the $87,000 seized under the section 400 notice. This request was 
declined by the Commissioner and duly communicated to the applicant by 
letter dated 28 February 1995. On 8 June 1995 the applicant was convicted 
on 66 charges of filing false returns of income. On 6 July 1995 the applicant 
was convicted on six charges of theft in relation to tax refunds made to his 
clients who were duly entitled to them. As a consequence of the criminal 
convictions for offences under the Crimes Act 1961 and ITA 1976, which 
were essentially for acting dishonestly, the applicant was assessed for a 
substantial amount in penal tax. The applicant commenced judicial review 
proceedings against the Commissioner's decision not to refund the balance 
that arose after the second assessment had been made. 
Of interest in Singh is that what the Commissioner held as surplus funds 
appeared to include the whole amount of the assessments in dispute and not 
only the non-deferrable sums, as had so far been the issue in relation to 
Anzamco, Miller v C of IR and Hieber. In this respect Singh appears to have 
broken new ground. Laurenson J in his judgment makes the significant point 
that, when the applicant was notified on 28 February 1995 that his request 
for a refund would not be met, the Commissioner's investigation had 
reached a point where 67 informations had been laid against the applicant 
alleging that false returns had been filed. The crucial point was that: 
as at 28 February 1995, the respondent had not only determined a clear picture of the 
applicant's tax liability, but he had also good reason to believe that the liability 
would be substantially increased by the imposition of penal tax if it was 
subsequently found that the applicant had, in fact, filed false returns in respect of his 
own affairs. 5! 
The above comments amply demonstrate the very close nexus that must 
exist between the surplus funds retained and a related future though 
51 At 15054 RHC. 
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impending tax liability. The impending liability must be very directly linked 
to the basis for obtaining the surplus funds in the first place. Any other 
nexus between existing funds and a general future liability would not 
suffice. It has to be as close as in Singh where the assessments related to the 
refunds falsely claimed and section 400 notices were served to meet 
assessments for such refunds. The surplus moneys from issuing the section 
400 notices could be held in order to meet future assessments for penal tax 
which were to be raised as a direct consequence of such deceptive conduct. 
The other rationale for entitlement to hold such surplus funds would be 
where the impending assessments will almost certainly exceed the surplus 
held, thereby nullifying any practical usefulness of making the refund. As 
observed by Laurenson J: 
The important point to note, as I see it, is that the balance of the monies held by the 
respondent as at the date of his decision, of approximately $40,000, were less than 
the total liability finally established of approximately $105,000. In fact all the 
monies obtained pursuant to the s 400 notice have been allocated by the respondent 
in part payment of the above sum. 52 
Having so closely circumscribed the circumstances where surplus monies so 
obtained can be retained, it appears that Laurenson J was mindful of the 
injunction by Barker J in Anzamco that since a notice interferes with the 
rights of the subject the legislation must be strictly construed. 
6. A Section 157 Notice and Other Fiduciary Relationships 
The High Court decision in King v Leary53 dealt with the issue of how wide 
a construction could be given to the obligation to pay money which was 
clearly identifiable as an "amount payable" as the phrase is defined in 
section 157(10). Thus, the Court had to decide whether the primary 
obligation to pay as between payer and payee could be extended to charge 
all persons who in any paying capacity had control of funds which were to 
pass to the taxpayer. 
The facts in King v Leary illustrate that the notice can be used by the 
Commissioner as a potent instrument for collecting unpaid taxes. The 
section 400 notice was issued at the same time as the default assessment was 
issued which created the debt. The notice was issued to the defendant 
solicitor and taxpayer. After the notice was issued, the defendant as trustee 
52 Supra note 42, at 15054. 
53 (1988) 10 NZTC 5067. 
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of the taxpayer's family trust received a cheque from the trust. Part of the 
amount represented by the cheque was paid out to the taxpayer by the 
defendant acting in his capacity as trustee, pursuant to instructions from the 
taxpayer's father who was settlor of the family trust. The Commissioner 
alleged that the payment to the taxpayer by the defendant solicitor was a 
clear breach of section 400, and brought a prosecution action under the then 
equivalent of section 157 A of the TAA (s 400 (9)(a) of the ITA 1976). The 
prosecution action was first heard in the District Court which decided that 
the funds had been held by the defendant on account of the family trust. 
When the money was paid out to the taxpayer, the amount was not payable 
by the defendant to the taxpayer, as was required by section 400, because 
the trust was the payer and not the defendant solicitor who was merely 
acting on instructions. Since the trust was the payer, the moneys so held 
were impressed by that trust. The Commissioner appealed by way of case 
stated to the High Court. Counsel for the Commissioner argued that, having 
regard to the authorities, the phrase "to be made from any amount payable 
by him to a taxpayer" (in the then equivalent to section 157 (1) (a)) had 
always been wide enough to override contractual relationships, fiduciary 
relationships and the relationship between a trustee and beneficiary. 
Heron J agreed with submissions made by counsel for the Commissioner 
that a much wider meaning was intended of the obligation to pay. Heron J 
agreed with the finding of the District Court that it was indeed correct to say 
that the amount in question was certainly one which was payable by the trust 
to the taxpayer but the obligation to pay was not restricted merely to this 
primary obligation to pay. His comments were as follows: 
The same amount was also "payable" by the solicitor to the taxpayer. He held 
monies on behalf of his client, the trust, but they became payable by him to the 
taxpayer on receipt of instructions from the trust. I think the section was not 
designed to confine itself to the primary obligation to pay, recognising only the 
ultimate relationship between the payer and payee. It was I believe designed to 
charge all persons who in any paying capacity had control of funds which were to go 
to the taxpayer. I think that is consistent with the practical interpretation that the 
words "payable" and "paid" have received and the policy of the section designed, 
once default has occurred, to intercept funds and cut across other obligations, 
whatever they may be, except where otherwise provided by statute. 54 
54 At 5073. It appears that s 157(10)(6) in defining "amount payable" gives effect to the 
decision in King v Leary by including amounts which are payable by a person as a 
trustee. 
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7. Section 157 and Statutory Priorities 
The comments towards the end of Heron J's judgment above suggest that a 
statutory notice cannot frustrate what statute may have already prescribed as 
the priority in which payments ought to be made. The statutory notice will 
take effect subject to any prior charges such as a mortgage, as illustrated in 
the High Court decision in Murphy v New Zealand Newspapers Ltd. 55 
In Murphy, the plaintiff solicitor, acted for the mortgagee in a mortgagee 
sale. After the realisation of proceeds from the sale, the mortgagee's claims 
were met in full. There was, however, a surplus of funds left over after the 
mortgagee's claims were satisfied, and efforts were made to contact the 
mortgagor with a view to paying over the surplus to the mortgagor in 
accordance with section 104 of the Property Law Act 1952 (PLA 1952). 
These efforts proved unsuccessful and the solicitor prepared to follow the 
procedure prescribed by the PLA 1952 and Land Transfer Act 1952 (LTA 
1952), whereby the surplus moneys, being bona vacantia (unclaimed), 
would be paid to the Crown. Before the solicitor could embark on this 
procedure, he was served with a section 400 notice in respect of tax arrears 
owed by the mortgagor. Shortly after receiving the Commissioner's 
statutory notice, he was served with a charging order by a creditor of the 
mortgagor. The plaintiff solicitor sought a declaratory judgment as to 
whether the sums had to be paid in total to the Crown because they were 
bona vacantia, or alternatively whether the Commissioner's and creditor's 
claim had to be satisfied first. 
Holland J responded to the competing claims on the basis of a construction 
of the statutory provisions. First, the provisions of section 104(1) were 
couched in mandatory terms when outlining the priority that had to be 
adhered to in dealing with the proceeds of a mortgagee sale. The priority 
was as follows: payment of expenses in facilitating the sale; meeting the 
claims of the first mortgagee; meeting the claims of subsequent registered 
mortgages and charges; and finally, paying any surplus to the mortgagor. In 
contrast to section 104(1) were the provisions in section 104(2) and section 
1 02A of the PLA 1952, which were directory or discretionary in nature. 
Section 104(2) provided that, where the mortgagor could not be found, the 
surplus may be paid to the Secretary to the Treasury. Section 102A(2) 
provided that, where any surplus money from a mortgagee sale could not be 
paid to a mortgagor because he could not be found, the proceeds may be 
paid to the Crown by remitting them to the Secretary to the Treasury. 
55 ( 1982) 5 TRNZ 876. 
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Holland J placed a great deal of importance on the differing statutory 
wording which meant that, in the event of the mortgagor not being found, 
the mortgagor did not lose his right to the surplus funds and so the funds 
could not automatically go to the Crown. If it was intended that, on the 
mortgagor not being found, the mortgagor had lost his entitlement to the 
surplus and that it should be paid to the Crown, then it would have been a 
simple matter for sections 1 02A and 1 04(2) of the PLA 1952 to say so. 
Simply because the mortgagor could not be found meant that, up until the 
moneys were paid over to the Crown, the mortgagor was still entitled to the 
surplus. Holland J then made reference to the Unclaimed Moneys Act 1971 
to support his view that inability to find the mortgagor did not mean that the 
mortgagor automatically lost entitlement to the surplus funds. Under the 
Unclaimed Moneys Act 1971 (UMA 1971) there were many instances 
where the mortgagee would have had to retain the money for six years 
before repaying the residual amount to the Crown. The effect of provisions 
such as sections 1 02(A)(2) and 1 04(2) was simply to relieve a mortgagee 
from retaining unclaimed moneys for extended periods of time. After 
unsuccessful efforts had been made at locating the mortgagor, the moneys 
could be paid to the Crown. 
On the facts in Murphy, this meant that, since the moneys had not been paid 
over to the Crown, the mortgagor was S!ill entitled to the surplus. 
Accordingly, the amounts claimed under the section 400 notice and the 
charging order could be met, although for practical reasons the full amount 
of the claim under the charging order could not be met in full as there were 
insufficient funds. 
There are other significant points that arise from the facts in Murphy, 
although not discussed in the judgment. Of interest is how Murphy 
illustrates that a Commissioner's notice will take effect subject to equities 
provided for by other statutes. Holland J as a first step identified the 
mortgage as one provided for by the LTA 1952.56 It was implicit that the 
priority for the disbursement of funds under a mortgagee sale had to be 
followed as prescribed by the LTA and the Commissioner's notice could not 
cut across such a pre-determined statutory priority. This seems clearly to be 
the case and cannot be affected by how early in time the Commissioner 
serves a statutory notice. 
The chronology in which the events occurred in Murphy, from the 
Commissioner's tax recovery point of view, would appear to be irrelevant 
56 At 878. 
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only in regard to prior statutory priorities but very relevant in respect of 
subsequent claimants. The sale of land occurred on 1 September 1981. After 
commission had been deducted the balance of the deposit totalling 
$2,315.20 was received by the plaintiff solicitor on 16 September 1981. On 
4 September 1981, the solicitor received a section 400 notice requiring 
payment of about $365 in tax arrears owing by the mortgagor. On 12 
October 1981, the solicitor was served a charging order for a debt of just 
under $7000 owed by the mortgagor to New Zealand Newspapers Ltd as the 
first defendant. The plaintiff deposed on 29 October 1981 that the total 
surplus moneys held from the mortgagee sale was $4762.63. 
The very early action taken in serving the notice as early as 4 September 
was pivotal in securing the Commissioner's position, as 38 days later a 
charging order was served for an amount far in excess of the surplus funds 
available. Had the charging order been served before the Commissioner's 
notice, it appears that, not only would the full amount claimed under the 
charging order not be met, but the Commissioner by being second in time 
would have no funds to meet his claim. Thus, early action made the 
Commissioner's enforcement action quite effective. Both Murphy and King 
v Leary are models of how swiftly and effectively the Commissioner can in 
fact use the statutory notice procedure. 
There is another aspect regarding the promptness with which the 
Commissioner served the statutory notice. The promptness was material in 
securing payment to the Commissioner, assuming that there were no other 
creditors besides the Commissioner. Even if there were other creditors, the 
Commissioner can still secure a prospect for payment where he is either first 
in time as in Murphy. or, even where the Commissioner is not first in time, 
other creditors' claims are not so large as to defeat any practical gain that the 
Commissioner may have in the surplus funds. The promptness was 
advantageous because it meant that, while the mortgagor was technically 
still entitled to the surplus, in terms of section 400/section 157 there was an 
"amount payable" in terms of section 157(10)(a) to which the notice could 
effectively attach. Had there not been prompt service of the notice, there 
would have been a real risk of the solicitor paying the money over to the 
Treasury, as he would not have been required to hold it for say six years as 
under the Unclaimed Moneys Act 1971 before paying it to the Crown. Once 
he had discovered that the mortgagor could not be found, he could have at 
that point paid the money over to the Treasury as indeed he was entitled to 
under the relevant provisions of the PLA 1952. 
If the notice had been served after the solicitor had paid it to the Crown, then 
the Commissioner's notice though valid would have had no effect as there 
2001 Powers of Commissioner of Inland Revenue 115 
would be no "amount payable" which would make the notice effective. In 
other words, once the amount was paid over to the Crown as unclaimed 
moneys or surplus moneys, the prospect of effectively using a statutory 
notice becomes redundant. It may be argued that the futility was only in 
respect of the effectiveness of the notice and not in the overall effect of the 
Crown ultimately receiving the money. It would appear that this argument 
may be partially valid. While it may close the avenue for an effective notice, 
the Crown receives the money as unclaimed or surplus money that the 
mortgagee or other creditor of the mortgagor has not claimed. Technically 
the Commissioner as an agent of the Crown would still have a tax debt 
owing. The net result is that the Treasury as one agent of the Crown gets the 
whole lot. However, if there had been a promptly served statutory notice, the 
Commissioner would have had the tax debt met and any balance (if any) 
would go to the Crown. Alternatively, if there were creditors other than the 
Commissioner as in Murphy, then assuming there were sufficient funds, the 
Commissioner's debt would be satisfied while the balance of the surplus 
would go to satisfy the other creditors in which case no residual sum is 
available for the Treasury as the other Crown agent. 
This raises a further point which flows on from Heron J' s comments in King 
v Leary that a section 157 notice cuts across other obligations, except where 
otherwise provided by statute. It could be said that Murphy takes matters 
further than King v Leary in that in Murphy there were two statutes, namely 
the ITA 1976 and the PLA 1952, which each sought to claim moneys for the 
Crown albeit by different agents of the Crown. Holland J resolved the matter 
on a technicality based on an issue of statutory construction of the relevant 
provisions of the PLA 1952 only. It appears that it is implicit in Holland J's 
reasoning that, despite the technical approach he adopted in resolving the 
issue, there is a particular effect. This is that the Crown cannot claim 
entitlement to all money as unclaimed sums under one statute when a claim 
is made under another statute by another Crown agent. In other words, the 
statute which claims the surplus or any part of it as a debt to the Crown must 
be given precedence over the statute that merely allows the surplus to be 
paid to the Crown for want of any claimant to the surplus. It was this 
argument that the Attorney-General in Murphy did not appreciate. 
This argument is a very logical one and has a great deal of merit. The wider 
policy underpinning this argument is that any surplus is payable to the 
Secretary to the Treasury only when there are no claims being made on it 
prior to it being paid to the Treasury. In other words, it must in fact be an 
amount which is bona vacantia. If there are claims, then the amount 
logically cannot be treated as a surplus which may be paid to the Crown, for 
only sums which no one is entitled to or does not claim an entitlement to are 
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payable to the Crown as unclaimed moneys. This principle seems to 
underpin the Unclaimed Moneys Act 1971 in that so far as moneys are 
unclaimed they logically may be paid to the Crown. This demonstrates that 
the Attorney-General should fail when he seeks to claim money as payable 
to the Crown when there are prior claimants as happened in Murphy. 
The argument that the Attorney-General cannot claim moneys that are the 
subject of a claim by another Crown agent is not merely academic. It can 
have significant implications for the Commissioner using the statutory 
notice procedure. The notice procedure has been discussed in relation to 
income tax debts. However, there is an identical notice procedure in the 
Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 (GST Act),57 the Student Loan Scheme 
Act 1992,58 the Gaming Duties Act 197!59 and the Child Support Act 
1991.60 
Furthermore, under the Accident Insurance Act 1998,61 the Commissioner 
can serve as the statutorily appointed agent for the collection of premiums. 
Under this Act the Commissioner is similarly empowered to use the 
statutory notice procedure under that Act to collect outstanding premiums.62 
The implications of the decision in Murphy appear to be that, provided that 
the notices are served before any surplus is paid to the Treasury, the notices 
are valid and effective. The notices if served promptly have the potential of 
collecting a range of revenues, and such collection cannot be defeated by 
any claims that the surplus must be paid to the Treasury. 
8. Section 157 and Sums Payable in the Future 
Another practical point worth noting is that a notice can attach moneys that 
in the future become an "amount payable". The notice does not become 
invalid merely because once served there is no amount then held by either a 
bank or a creditor in favour of the taxpayer. This is envisaged by section 
157(1)(a) and (b) as well as by section 157(10)(b) and (c)(ii). The notice 
subsists until money becomes credited to the taxpayer at a future date. 
57 Section 43. 
58 Section 46. 
59 Section 12L. 
60 Section 154. 
61 Section 316. 
62 Section 313. Also of note are s 46 of theAccident Compensation Act 1982 and s 130 of 
the Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 (both repealed), 
and which were the then statutory notice equivalents to s 313 of the 1998 Act. 
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The Australian equivalent provision in section 218(1) of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936 (ITAA 1936) is similar to New Zealand's in that it 
also refers to the prospect of amounts being subject to the notice which are 
"accruing" or may become due to a taxpayer. Fox J in Huston & Anor v 
DFC ofT expressed the view that, when issuing a notice under section 218 
of the Australian Act, the Commissioner was not confined to situations in 
which there was, at the time of service of the notice, money due and payable 
by any person to the taxpayer or which otherwise at the time satisfied one of 
the paragraphs of section 218.63 His Honour proceeded to comment that: 
A notice can be issued under sec 218 which may have only a prospective application. 
I do not mean, in putting the matter that way, to suggest that the Commissioner, if 
challenged, must establish that at some time one of the paragraphs will apply, but 
rather that he is by the section enabled to issue a notice even if it may apply only to 
circumstances arising in the future, as between garnishee and taxpayer. 64 
The Federal Court of Australia in Re Edelsten; Donnelly v Edelsten,65 
referred to this future liability by the debtor when it noted that the words 
"any money, may become due" are "apt, in the context, to refer to an 
identifiable sum payable upon a contingency".66 Thus, there was a strong 
intimation that future amounts which become payable, on their coming into 
existence, may come within the purview of section 218. 
The decision in Re Edelsten; Donnelly v Edelsten was appealed against by 
the Deputy Federal Commissioner of Taxation to the Full Federal Court. 
The Full Federal Court decided the appeal in its decision in Deputy Federal 
Commissioner of Taxation v Donnelly & Ors which is recognised as the 
leading case on section 218.67 The Full Federal Court examined the issue of 
the extent to which section 218 affected sums of money which became 
owing to the taxpayer in the future. 
Von Doussa J of the Full Federal Court agreed with comments of Burchett J 
in the Federal Court decision that the words "any money ... may become 
due" in section 218(1)(a) were apt in context to refer to an identifiable sum 
payable upon a contingency.68 Von Doussa J, however, opined that, if the 
conditions of section 218(1) did not exist when a notice was issued, this did 
63 83 ATC 4525. 
64 At4531 LHC. 
65 88 ATC4958. 
66 At 4965. 
67 89 ATC 5071. 
68 Cited at supra note 65. 
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not mean that the notice was then and forever null and incapable of taking 
effect in the future should the contingent provisions of section 218(1) later 
come into existence. The notice would simply not be binding at the time 
when it was given. The effect of a notice served in such circumstances was 
expressed as follows: 
In my opinion a notice may be given prospectively under sec 218. When this is done, 
no obligation is imposed on the third party unless or until circumstances arise 
between the third party and the taxpayer which bring into existence an identifiable 
debt owing to the taxpayer, whether payable forthwith, or on a fixed date, or on a 
contingency. The principles which apply to the assignment of future property do 
provide a helpful guide. Equity fastens upon the future property to make the assignor 
a trustee of the legal right of ownership for the assignee when the property comes 
into existence and when it is identifiable as property meeting the description of the 
assignment .... Until identifiable property comes into existence there is no subject 
matter in respect of which the assignment can operate. Likewise, in the case of a 
prospective notice given under sec 218, until there is an identifiable sum of money 
owing to the taxpayer by the third party the conditions of the section are not met. It 
is the coming into existence of the identifiable debt which crystallises the obligation 
on the third party to pay to the Commissioner the "money" referred to in sec 218 (1) 
and provides the measure of the obligation which is imposed by the notice. If for any 
reason circumstances do not arise after the giving of the notice where "money" 
answering the description in sec 218 (1) comes into existence, no obligation is ever 
imposed on the third party to make any payment to the Commissioner. Where 
"money" does come into existence later, only at the point in time when it does so is 
an obligation imposed on the third party.69 
Lockhart J agreed with the conclusion of von Doussa J on this point, that a 
notice may be given under section 218 which is prospective in the sense that 
it may operate with respect to debts that are not brought into existence until 
after the date of service of the notice.70 Furthermore, Lockhart J 
acknowledged that the specific point on the prospective effect of a notice 
had not been argued before the Full Federal Court, but accepted that his 
conclusion must be correct and was also supported by the language of the 
section which had the phrases "or may become due" and "or may 
subsequently hold". Hill J, the third member of the Court ,concurred.? I 
This approach was confirmed by Brennan J in the High Court of Australia 
decision in Clyne v DFC ofT when he said: 
69 Supra note 67, at 5080 RHC. 
70 Ibid, 5076 LHC. 
71 Ibid, 5094 LHC. 
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when a notice is given pursuant to the section, it takes effect according to its tenor. 
The third person is immediately bound to comply with it, though his obligation is not 
to be discharged until some later time.72 
Thus, a notice which seeks to attach amounts payable to the taxpayer in the 
future does not entitle the Commissioner to require a debtor of the taxpayer 
to pay the amount owed to the taxpayer before the debt becomes payable.73 
The notice on being served is dormant and operates as if it were a floating 
charge so that as soon as the debt comes into existence the charge created by 
the section 157 notice crystallises. There is no provision for any time limit 
that any notice stays effective for, as once it is issued, it takes effect until 
such time as a notice of revocation is issued by the Commissioner. 
Although there is no New Zealand decision that articulates the prospective 
effect of a notice as in Australia pursuant to the Full Federal Court decision 
in Donnelly & Ors,74 it could be argued that Murphy implicitly recognised 
that this was the case in its result. It could be argued that the chronology of 
the events in Murphy strongly suggest that the Commissioner was successful 
only because he had served a notice which could only have had prospective 
effect. In Murphy, although the sale had occurred on 1 September 1981, the 
balance of the deposit was not received by the solicitor until 16 September 
1981. The Commissioner's notice was served on 4 September 1981 and was 
prospective in effect, but crystallised on 16 September when the solicitor 
finally received the balance of the proceeds of the deposit. 
72 81 ATC 4429, 4442 RHC. 
73 This was confirmed in the High Court of Australia decision in Clyne v DFC ofT 81 
ATC 4429, with Brennan J saying: "But the third person cannot be required to pay the 
Commissioner before the money becomes due and payable; the notice does not 
accelerate the time for payment" (at 4442). Mason J, who provided the leading 
judgment in Clyne v DFC of T, also said as follows: "and it cannot be that the 
Commissioner can by notice require a debtor of a taxpayer to pay the money which he 
owes to the taxpayer before the debt, as between the debtor and the taxpayer, has 
become payable" (at 4436 LHC). 
74 More recently in DFC ofT v Conley and Ors 98 ATC 5090, Tam berlin J of the Full 
Federal Court commented: "Thus a s 218 notice can be given when no money is 
presently due to the taxpayer but where it may become due and where it may be held 
by the recipient on account of the taxpayer" (at 5092 RHC). 
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VI. EXCLUSIONS FROM THE AMBIT OF SECTION 157 
1. Statutory Exclusions 
The definition of "amount payable" in section 157(10) specifically does not 
include money in an account that is a Home Lay-By Account under the Post 
Office Act 1959, a Home Ownership Account under the Home Ownership 
Savings Act 1974, a Farm Ownership Account under the Farm Ownership 
Savings Act 1974, or a Fishing Vessel Ownership Account under the 
Fishing Vessel Ownership Savings Act 1977. 
It appears that the saving of the above categories of accounts from the effect 
of section 157 notices is based on public policy grounds designed to 
facilitate the ownership of homes, farms and fishing vessels. It is worth 
noting that the Australian equivalent to section 157 does not contain such 
exempt accounts and neither does section 224 of the Canadian Income Tax 
Act which is the equivalent provision. 
2. Section 157 and Joint Accounts 
The issue has arisen of whether joint accounts can be attached. The principle 
under ordinary banking law is that a garnishee order will not be effective on 
joint accounts. The judgment of Pollock B, in Beasley v Roney, is an early 
articulation of the principle that: 
the debt owing by a garnishee to a judgment debtor which can be attached to answer 
the judgment debt must be a debt due to the judgment debtor alone, and that where it 
is only due to him jointly with another it cannot be attached.75 
In Hirschhorn v Evans,76 a judgment debtor and his wife had a joint account 
with the appellant bank, on which account either of them could draw. A 
garnishee order was made on this account in respect of a debt owed by the 
husband. The Court of Appeal held that a joint account with a bank, even if 
owned by a husband and wife, could not be attached under a garnishee order 
in respect of a debt by one of the joint owners. Slesser LJ articulated the 
majority view of the Court in opining as follows: 
I think that one has to look at the account as a whole, and, looking at the account as a 
whole, I think that it is in the nature of a joint account on which the bank are liable to 
both parties jointly, and, consequently, the garnishee order is misconceived in stating 
75 [1891]1 QB 509, 512. 
76 [1938]3 AllER 491. 
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that the bank are indebted to the said judgment debtor in the sum there stated, 
whereas, in reality, they are indebted to the judgment debtor and to his wife 
jointly.77 
In Canada, the Court of Appeal in Banff Park Savings and Credit Union Ltd 
v Rose 78 held that a joint bank account could not be attached under a 
garnishee order on the same reasoning. 
This being a consistent principle in banking law as far as a garnishee order is 
concerned, the question arises whether there is any change in its application 
in the case of statutory notices issued in respect of tax debts. Both Australia 
and New Zealand are consistent in their approaches in that the principle of 
banking law just discussed also applies in the case of statutory notices and 
tax debts. 
The issue was considered in the Supreme Court of New South Wales 
decision in DFC ofT v Westpac Savings Bank Ltd & Ors.19 There was a 
bank account in the joint names of three taxpayers on which the 
Commissioner served a section 218 notice, for the taxation liability that each 
had incurred separately in their own individual right. Bryson J followed the 
reasoning of Slesser LJ in Hirschhorn v Evans that it is in the nature of a 
joint account that the bank is jointly liable to both parties. However, Bryson 
J was not content to base his reasoning only on Slesser LJ's in Hirschhorn v 
Evans. His Honour commented that section 218 proceeded on the basis of 
distinctness of obligation of the taxpayer, and of entitlement of the taxpayer. 
This in His Honour's view accorded "with the personal and several nature of 
the obligations to pay tax which the legislation lays on taxpayers". 80 
It would be quite incongruous with the statutory scheme if the legislation 
created a situation where one person or one person's assets came under an 
obligation for payment of tax levied on some other person, which would 
precisely be the effect if a joint account could effectively become subject to 
a section 218 notice. As submitted by the first defendant, if Parliament 
intended to override the law as settled in Hirschhorn v Evans, "there would 
be a need for express language". 81 
77 At496. 
78 (1982) 139 DLR 3d 769. 
79 87 ATC 4346. 
80 Ibid, 4352 RHC. 
81 Ibid. 
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In New Zealand the High Court considered the effect of a section 157 notice 
on a joint account in C of IR v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Ltd.82 
This was pursuant to a practice of the Commissioner of applying deduction 
notices to a joint account if the signatory was "either or". The Commissioner 
assessed the husband for approximately $141,000 in income tax. The 
husband and wife had a joint account, and the Commissioner served a notice 
on the Bank thereby demanding payment of all monies in the joint account. 
The question Ellis J had to determine was whether the monies in the joint 
account were "payable in relation to the taxpayer". Following Slesser LJ in 
Hirschhorn v Evans, he held that the monies were not payable to the 
taxpayer without the wife's authority, as the bank was jointly indebted to 
both the husband and the wife and not to the husband exclusively. 
Accordingly, the Bank was entitled in its actions to disregard the notice. 
Although the Commissioner failed in his bid in C of /R v ANZ Banking 
Group (New Zealand) Ltd to attach a joint account using a section 157 
notice, he does have the power to deduct money from joint bank accounts 
for debts under the Child Support Act. 83 
The Commissioner is quite entitled to use a section 157 notice to seize 
money in a term investment even before its maturity date. Money in 
investment portfolios can also be seized, such as superannuation schemes, 
however the Commissioner accepts that he cannot by serving a notice on a 
bank account put a taxpayer into, or further increase, an existing overdraft. 84 
The position regarding a statutory notice and a current account is contrary to 
banking law. The law has long established that the relationship of banker 
and customer in respect of a current account is one where the bank is merely 
a debtor of the proprietor of the current account, and on this basis as a matter 
of law cannot be said to hold money on account of such person. 85 However, 
unlike the position with respect to joint accounts, section 157(10)(c) 
specifically overrides this general principle of banking law pertaining to 
current accounts. In the definition of "amount payable" where the person is a 
bank, it includes money, including interest on that money, which is on 
current account. 
82 (1998) 18 NZTC 13,643. 
83 Section 155. Also notes 860 of the Social Security Act 1964 which contains an 
identical provision for attaching joint accounts. 
84 (August 1999) 11 Tax Information Bulletin No 7, 5. 
85 Foley v Hill (1848) 11 HLC 28 (9 ER 1002); Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation 
(1921) 3 KB !10. 
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VII. FRUSTRATING THE EFFECT OF SECTION 157 
1. Diverting Funds Before Receipt By Third Party 
From the discussion thus far, a notice can be frustrated if a taxpayer holds 
his or her funds in a joint account. Certainly from the comments by Von 
Doussa J in Donnelly,86 it is clear that the obligation on the third party to 
comply with the notice does not arise till the "money" comes into existence. 
So although these comments in Donnelly were in respect of the validity of a 
prospective notice, it will despite being valid not have an effect on the third 
party until funds actually arrive in the custody or control of the third party. 
This means that, once a notice is served and in terms of section 157 (5) a 
taxpayer is notified, there does not appear to be any impediment statutory or 
otherwise from enabling a taxpayer to frustrate the notice. One way in which 
it may be frustrated would be to assign future payments to another person or 
that other person's account for valuable consideration in disregard of notices 
served under section 157. Alternatively, instalments payable under a loan by 
a debtor to a taxpayer's bank can on instructions be made payable to another 
bank or person as agent of the taxpayer. In the case of a bank for instance it 
appears that the taxpayer can instruct prospective creditors of the taxpayer 
paying money not to pay it to a particular bank but to re-route the payments 
through another bank. On the basis of Anzamco,87 it would not be sufficient 
to have funds merely diverted to another account in another branch of the 
same bank. It would have to be an entirely different bank or third party such 
as a credit union or building society to which funds have to be diverted. 
However, the diversion, if it is to occur, has to occur before the funds reach 
the third party subject to the notice. Once the funds which are subject to a 
prospective notice arrive in the custody of this third party, any subsequent 
attempts to divert the funds through an assignment for instance will have no 
effect, as clearly illustrated by the High Court of Australia decision in Clyne 
v Deputy Federal Commissioner ofTaxation.88 The facts in Clyne were that, 
on 9 July 1979, the Commissioner served an income tax assessment on the 
taxpayer for the year ended 30 June 1979. The tax owing was assessed at 
$118,436. The assessment notice stated that the tax was due and payable on 
8 August 1979. On 10 July 1979, the Commissioner gave notices under 
section 218 of the Australian Act (similar to section 157) to a branch of the 
Commonwealth Trading Bank where the taxpayer held interest-bearing 
deposits of $70,000 which matured on the following dates: $10,000 on 21 
86 Supra note 67, at 5080 RHC. 
87 Supra note 42. 
88 81 ATC4429. 
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September 1979; $25,000 on 9 April 1980; and $35,000 on 20 April 1980. 
The notices required the bank to hand over the $70,000 to the Commissioner 
in part payment of the taxpayer's tax liability when the deposits matured at 
various dates after 21 September 1979. On 4 September 1979, the taxpayer, 
by deed, assigned the deposits to the second appellant as security for future 
advances and gave notice of the assignment to the bank. There were a 
number of issues that were raised as a consequence of the notices being 
served, but the one of direct relevance was whether the taxpayer was correct 
in his argument that the subsequent assignment of the right to the deposits 
operated to defeat the notices. Gibbs CJ answered this argument as follows: 
Subsequent actions by the taxpayer cannot render the requirement nugatory or 
ineffective .... However, once the notice is given, it operates to prevent any 
subsequent dealing with the money which will prevent compliance with the notice 
when the time for compliance arrives. An assignment made by the taxpayer after the 
date of the notice will be ineffective to relieve the person to whom the notice is 
given of his statutory obligation to pay the money to the Commissioner. 
Notwithstanding the assignment, the money will be "due" at the time when it would 
have become payable to the taxpayer if it had not been for the subsequent 
assignment whose effect is to be ignored.89 
Brennan J articulated his response to the taxpayer's argument saying: 
Between the time when the notice is given and the time when the obligation is to be 
discharged, the third person is not at liberty to pay to the taxpayer the money falling 
within the terms of the notice; the third party is obliged to retain it in order to 
discharge the obligation to pay the money to the Commissioner in compliance with 
the requirement expressed in the notice .... The giving of the notice thus affects the 
rights of the taxpayer who, once the notice is given, is statutorily divested of his right 
to payment of the whole or a part of the money specified in the notice ... an 
obligation to obey the assignor's direction cannot prevail over an earlier statutory 
requirement to pay the money to the Commissioner.90 
For New Zealand purposes, the comments in Clyne would apply but with 
one additional significant difference. This is that on service of the notice by 
virtue of section 157 (8) the money subject to the notice is deemed to be 
held in trust for the Crown. In other words, service of the notice creates a 
proprietary interest and so the Commissioner's right to payment 
89 At 4433RHC-4434 LHC. Mason J agreed saying: "The effect of imposing the 
obligation is to make it unlawful for the recipient to pay the moneys to anyone but the 
Commissioner after service of the notice" (at 4440 RHC). 
90 At 4442-4443. 
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distinguishes him from a garnishor of a debt who obtains no proprietary 
interest in the debt owing to the judgment debtor. Consequently, any attempt 
to divert or assign moneys subject to the notice is tantamount to breach of 
trust but more seriously an act of theft or misappropriation as it is 
inconsistent with the Crown's deemed proprietary interest. This is all the 
more reason why, if any action is to occur to frustrate the operation of a 
notice, it occurs so as to prevent money coming into the hands of the third 
party in the first place so as to avoid the property becoming Crown property. 
2. Effect of Bankruptcy And Discharge From Bankruptcy 
Another way in which a section 157 notice can be frustrated is by the 
taxpayer becoming bankrupt and subsequently being discharged from 
bankruptcy. On being discharged, no amount of tax is thereafter due and the 
consequence of a notice served prior to bankruptcy in such circumstances is 
that it will lapse. 
The effect of a statutory notice served in such circumstances is not such as 
to be able to attach amounts due to the taxpayer after being discharged from 
bankruptcy. The taxpayer's status on being discharged is as if he or she has 
no prior debts, whether tax debts or other debts. Accordingly, a notice 
served prior to bankruptcy does not survive even so as to remain dormant 
through the bankruptcy only to crystallise and attach debts or amounts 
owing to the taxpayer after being discharged from bankruptcy. This seems to 
be the position pursuant to a decision of the Australian Full Federal Court in 
DFC ofTv Government Insurance Office.91 
In DFC ofT v Government Insurance Office, notices of assessment of 
income tax were issued on 3 April 1986. On 1 July 1986 the taxpayer 
commenced civil proceedings against a third party, namely, Government 
Insurance Office ("GIO"). On 3 October 1986 the Deputy Commissioner 
served a section 218 notice requiring the GIO to pay to the Commissioner so 
much of any moneys that may become due as a consequence of the litigation 
to the taxpayer up to the amount of $52,499.82. On 14 July 1987 the 
taxpayer became bankrupt on his own bankruptcy petition. On 15 July 1990 
the taxpayer was discharged from bankruptcy and on 13 August 1991 the 
taxpayer obtained judgment against the GIO for the sum of $10,793 plus 
costs. The Full Federal Court by majority held that the notice served prior to 
bankruptcy did not survive the bankruptcy and discharge from bankruptcy 
so as to attach the judgment amount. Being discharged from bankruptcy 
meant that the status of the taxpayer had radically changed whereby he was 
91 93 ATC 4901. 
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completely absolved from his prior indebtedness. It therefore followed that 
action for the recovery of prior debts would not subsist on the taxpayer's 
discharge from bankruptcy. 
3. Accounts Denominated In Foreign Currency 
Another avenue in which a notice can be frustrated is when it is served on 
accounts denominated in foreign currency. If the notice demands a New 
Zealand dollar amount but the bank account is denominated in US dollars, 
there is an absence of uniformity in the unit of account. The Full Federal 
Court of Australia in DFC ofT v Conley & Ors,92 considered this very 
question in the context of a section 218 notice served to attach 
$67,242,842.05 in accounts with the National Australia Bank which were 
denominated in United States dollars. The Court held that the Australian Act 
recognised the necessity for money to be expressed in terms of a unit of 
account. The unit of account for the Act was Australian currency and an 
assessment made under the Act had to be expressed in Australian currency. 
If section 218 was intended by the legislature to apply to foreign currency, 
there would be an expectation of some indication of the time and method of 
conversion to Australian currency to be contained in the Act. However, no 
such mechanism existed. The lack of a conversion mechanism created 
anomalies, especially in cases where the debt due to the taxpayer which 
formed the subject of the section 218 notice was not presently payable. A 
significant lapse of time, between the time of service of a notice and the 
time when money becomes payable, could result in significant fluctuations 
in the relevant exchange rate. This could result in significant differences 
between the amount of foreign currency calculated and the amount of tax 
owing by the taxpayer. Emmett J, who provided the leading judgment in 
Conley, articulated some of these difficulties as follows: 
The difficulties as to the time at which a conversion calculation is to be made in 
order to determine how much of foreign currency is attached by a notice under 
section 218 indicates, in my opinion, that foreign currency is not intended to be the 
subject of such a notice. The absence of any indication in section 218 itself that it 
was intended to apply to foreign currency and the absence of any mechanism for 
conversion ... reinforces the conclusion that foreign currency is not intended to be 
the subject of a notice under section 218.93 
92 98 ATC 5090. (A more detailed discussion of the decision in Conley is by Bolwell, 
"When money is not money" (July 2000) 3 New Zealand Tax Planning Report 21). 
93 At 5099-5100. 
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These same difficulties also arise under section 157 and the reasons outlined 
by Emmett J would apply in frustrating the effect of a section 157 notice on 
accounts denominated in foreign currency. 
4. Successful Objection or Challenge of an Assessment 
Other circumstances in which a notice could be frustrated is where a 
taxpayer objects to or challenges an assessment and such objection is 
allowed either in proceedings before the TRA or the High Court. This 
necessarily raises the issue of an assessment being issued and a notice also 
being served close in time so as to deprive the taxpayer of its rights 
effectively to object to or challenge the assessment. 
It appears that the taxpayer will be given the chance successfully to object to 
or challenge the assessment rather than have such a right forfeited by a 
statutory notice. This certainly is being advocated by the cautionary 
comments of Burchett J in Edelsten v Wilcox & Anor94 that: 
Section 218 [equivalent to section !57] must, I think, be seen as part of the whole 
scheme of the Act for the collection and recovery of tax, which of course, includes 
rights of objection and appeal. It is a strong power designed to protect the revenue 
but it was not intended to subvert the principle which has been established at least 
since Magna Carta, that a citizen's property should not be subject to arbitrary 
seizure. It cannot have been contemplated that the power should be used to negate 
the rights to contest assessments contained in the Act by the complete wiping out of 
a business of a taxpayer who is genuinely pursuing avenues of appeaJ.95 
This last point raises another matter which may have been largely implied 
up to this point and that is the relationship between an assessment and a 
section 157 notice. The notice follows from the assessment, and the notice 
itself does not create the indebtedness for a tax liability. As stated by Hill J: 
section 218 [equivalent to section 157] could not operate to impose a tax. Section 
218 is properly to be characterised as a law to facilitate the recovery of tax initially 
due and owing, rather than as a law imposing some new tax.96 
A number of consequences flow from this relationship between an 
assessment and a section 157 notice which are not expressed in the 
provisions of section 157 and which therefore need to be determined 
94 88 A TC 4484. 
95 At 4494 RHC--4495 LHC. 
96 Supra note 91, at 4913 RHC. 
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pursuant to this relationship. Section 157 is silent on its effect in the event 
that tax no longer becomes payable because for instance its effect is 
frustrated for the reasons just discussed. In such circumstances does the 
section envisage that the third party in receipt of the notice must still make 
payment to the Commissioner of tax no longer payable, or must the recipient 
pay only where tax is properly payable? It would follow that, if the section 
157 notice takes life from the assessment, then it cannot still be used to 
demand payment where the assessed debt has been dealt with. So, if the 
assessment has been successfully challenged or objected to or the assessed 
debt has been cleared through a discharge from bankruptcy, the section 157 
notice suffers the same fate in that it too is neutralised or lapses. If the 
section 157 notice is however seen as creating a debt in its own right which 
is still payable, although in terms of the assessment there is no tax properly 
payable, a preposterous situation arises. This is because a taxpayer would 
still be required to make payment to the Commissioner only then to reverse 
the effect of this by seeking to recover an amount that was wrongly paid. 
This could not have been the intention of Parliament. 97 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As observed by Richardson J in Controller and Auditor-General v 
Davison,98 the imposition and operation of taxes is a public governmental 
activity. The learned judge went further to state that, more importantly, the 
due imposition and collection of taxes is fundamental to the functioning of 
government.99 Tax is imposed by the Income Tax Act 1994 and the 
Commissioner's role is to quantify and collect the tax that is found to be 
owing. Bingham LJ in R v Board of IR ex parte MFK Underwriting 
AgenciesiOO summarised this as common knowledge that the Revenue is a 
tax-collecting agency, not a tax-imposing authority. 
It is the act of the Commissioner in assessing the tax which determines the 
indebtedness of the subject to the Crown. The assessment for tax is the 
statutory judgment of the liability of every taxpayer which the 
Commissioner has a legal obligation to make and in respect of which he 
does not have a general dispensing power.101 It is perhaps because taxation 
and the collection of taxes are pivotal to the functioning of government that 
tax debts appear to be subject to a unique regime. The regime is unique both 
97 DFC ofT v Government Insurance Office 93 4901, 4912 RHC. 
98 [1996]2 NZLR 278, 303. 
99 At 306. 
100 [1990]1 AllER 91, 110. 
101 Brierley Investments Ltdv CIR (1993) 15 NZTC 10212. 
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in terms of how the debt is arrived at and in the way in which it can be 
collected. 
The Commissioner's powers to collect taxes, simply using the statutory 
notice procedure prescribed by section 157, would appear to place him in a 
privileged position not enjoyed by other creditors. Simply having made an 
assessment, and given the taxpayer a due date for payment, allows 
enforcement to commence after the expiry of the due date. As noted by 
Casey J in Brierley Investments Ltd v C of IR,102 it cannot be an abuse of 
power for the Commissioner to collect taxes when they are properly due. 
The unique powers enabling the Commissioner to collect tax debts pursuant 
to section 157 do not require prior notification to the taxpayer before being 
used. For, as Mansfield J said in Woodroffe & Anor v DFC ofT, in respect 
of the Australian equivalent: 
In my view, such an intention is clearly evidenced by section 218 itself. Its object is 
to secure the payment of taxation liability. It would frustrate the fulfilment of that 
object if such advance notice were required to be given, which might facilitate the 
movement of the funds the subject of the proposed notice.! 03 
Use of the notice procedure by the Commissioner may become more 
prevalent, not only because of recent criticisms of the Commissioner's 
actions in collecting tax debts, but also in the drive to shore up the actual 
annual tax take by Government. 
The exercise of the power can come as a rude shock to many a hapless 
taxpayer, primarily because of the stealth with which it is used. The best 
insurance against the exercise of such an invasive power is to ensure that, 
not only are taxes paid, but more importantly that they are paid when they 
fall due. 
102 At 10214. 
103 2000 ATC 4654, 4657. 
